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Introduction 
One of the striking features of public policy over the last three decades has been the growing 
utilisation of quantitative measures of institutional performance in many countries to make 
judgements and allocate resources. The key feature of these systems is that the resulting 
rankings of institutions such as schools, hospitals and police forces are published by government 
bodies and publicised by the media. They are to be distinguished from ‘intelligence systems’ [1] 
that also produce rankings but rather than publishing these widely, use them to inform the 
institutions themselves and those responsible for monitoring them. Such systems operate, for 
example, in the area of public transport and have also been described in an educational context 
[2]. It has been argued that these latter systems have advantages over published systems [3] in 
that they minimise unwanted or ‘perverse’ side effects such as ‘gaming’ to improve ranking 
position. They also address directly the underlying issues of how institutional performance can 
be improved, rather than indirectly attempting to achieve this by exposing current performance 
for public scrutiny. While in many respects the statistical issues associated with design and 
analysis are the same, in this review I shall not consider intelligence systems in any detail, but 
concentrate on a discussion of public rankings. I shall deal largely with rankings in the area of 
education, especially school education. Health is dealt with separately in this volume [4] and the 
statistical issues in other areas are similar. 
This review will address itself to the issues associated with the design of ranking systems, and 
the modelling and interpretation the results of published rankings. Ideally there would be a 
discussion of evaluations of the effects of such systems, but such evaluations, however 
desirable, are rare and typically not envisaged when systems are designed. Where attempted, 
however, these will be noted. The next section will set out some basic concepts, and this is 
followed by sections that address different areas of application and technicalities.  This is 
followed by some examples and I will conclude with  recommendations and areas for further 
work. 
Constructing rankings 
To illustrate the process of ranking construction consider the case of school education where 
data are available from individual students attending each school. These may be in the form of, 
for example, responses to a questionnaire seeking views about satisfaction with teaching, or the 
results of test or examination scores. Typically, data are chosen to represent a particular time 
point or period, such as the age at which external tests for admission to higher education are 
taken. At its simplest a ranking will be formed by calculating the mean value, over students, and 
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then producing a ranked list of these means. There may be several of these, for example, for 
different curriculum subjects and for some purposes these may be averaged into a single index 
using weights, as is done for rankings of universities [5]. This is an example where rankings are 
based upon aggregate measures made at the institutional level. For universities these would 
include such things as reputation among peers and measures of total research output. I will 
discuss issues associated with these in a later section. First, I will deal with cases where linked 
information is available on individuals within institutions as is often the case with schools. 
Aggregate rankings have been subject to criticism on two broad counts. The first is that they fail 
to ‘contextualise’ the results by taking into account factors over which institutions have little 
control but which nevertheless have a strong association with the results. A particularly 
important factor is a selective intake so that for example, hospital units may have different case 
mixes with some having higher risk patients than others, and schools that recruit ‘high achieving’ 
students will be expected to have higher test and exam scores than others, irrespective of the 
quality of the schooling received. If that is the case then the ostensible purpose of the ranking, 
namely to compare schooling quality, will be undermined. A number of authors have discussed 
this issue and shown how such contextual factors can be incorporated as covariates in a model 
based ‘value added’ approach [6-8]. The following model captures the essence of such 
approaches and will be elaborated as appropriate. 
The basic data structure is that of a 2-level hierarchy with students nested within schools, or 
patients nested within hospitals etc. The standard approach to describing such data is via a 
multilevel or random effects model as follows [9] 
 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗 
𝑒𝑖𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑒
2),      𝑢𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2)        (1) 
where for simplicity we assume mutually independent normal random effects. Our response, for 
example an examination score at the end of secondary (high) school, for student i in school j is 
𝑦𝑖𝑗  and 𝑥𝑖𝑗  is, for example, a prior achievement test score designed to capture any selection by 
prior achievement. In the next section we will discuss this model further, but for now we shall 
describe how, with appropriate data, we can derive rankings. 
Ignoring the possibility of any missing data model (1) is fitted to all those students in the sample, 
which may be the total number of pupils in each school year group or cohort. Under the 
normality assumption we can obtain parameter estimates and also posterior estimates for each 
of the random effects 𝑢𝑗. If maximum likelihood is used these effects are the usual shrunken 
residuals, and the equivalent posterior estimates can be obtained from a straightforward 
Bayesian analysis, for example using a Gibbs sampler with diffuse priors [9, Chapter 2].  The 
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following figure shows a ranking of a sample of 266 schools in England with a median cohort size 
of 190 [10].  
Figure 1. 
 
The response is a normalised examination score taken at the end of compulsory secondary schooling in 
grade 11 and this is adjusted using a test score taken prior to entry to secondary school, ethnic group and 
various measures of social and linguistic disadvantage. The vertical bars are conventional 95% normal 
intervals. It can be seen that about half of the schools have an interval that includes the population mean. 
If we wish to compare two chosen schools in terms of whether their intervals overlap, then an appropriate 
interval length for this can be computed and is approximately 0.7 times the intervals displayed above [11]. 
We also note that similar results can be displayed directly in terms of rankings, rather than residual 
estimates, with corresponding intervals [8].  
Such displays can be  used to provide basic information about school ‘effects’ that may be of use in terms 
of more detailed follow-up of individual institutions by, for example inspectors.  They have also been 
advocated for use, for example, by students’ parents as an aid in choosing schools, although their use as 
such is problematic since what is really required is a prediction of school effects several years ahead and 
this adds extra uncertainty that makes any statistical separation very difficult [10 and is further explored in 
a later example. Alternative formulations have been proposed based upon measuring the effects of 
individual teachers during a period of schooling and this will be dealt with below.  
The use of such adjusted or ‘value added’ models is intuitively appealing as an improvement on the use of 
unadjusted means and has become reasonably well established in the area of schooling. In other areas, 
however, this approach is more problematic. In the case of the expanding area of university rankings (see 
for example [12]) it is typically difficult to find sensible adjustment variables, and measuring and linking 
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these together for individuals within universities would also be difficult. Furthermore, it is often not clear 
what the purpose of such rankings is. Thus, if the intention is to provide choice for undergraduate 
applicants, then a measure of degree outcome or satisfaction would seem appropriate, but such measures 
tend to be incomparable both across universities and across disciplines. If the intention is to provide 
overall measures of research performance there are further difficulties with defining this in terms of 
factors such as citation indices and there seems to be little consensus about this [13]. Another difficulty 
lies with the typical requirement to combine individual indicators into a single measure for presentational 
purposes and this will involve decisions about which weights to use in such a process. A more detailed 
discussion is given in [3] and I shall return to this issue later.  
I now look at various extensions and practical issues and how these may be dealt with.  
The implementation of adjusted ranking models 
The first key area of concern is with the nature of the criterion being used to judge institutional 
performance. It is not only with university rankings that this issue is discussed. In the area of 
schooling, while the use of test scores is common, there are objections to this in terms of a 
resulting over-concentration by schools on improving test scores at the expense of broader 
educational measures or promoting some students at the expense of others in order to improve 
their league table position. Likewise in measuring aspects of policing the choice of outcome is 
debateable. While such debates are important they are additional to the technical concerns of 
this chapter and will not be pursued, but see [3].  
When adjustments are incorporated into ranking models these typically are based upon 
measures taken at an earlier time or set of times. They are distinct from ‘scaling’ adjustments 
that might be used, for example, to measure university research output per academic where a 
measure of total output is scaled by an estimate of the number contributing to it. Such an 
estimate may not be straightforward to compute, but this is a measurement problem rather that 
a modelling one per se. On the other hand, a university drop-out rate might need to be adjusted 
for intake measures in order to avoid, for example, manipulation of results by exclusion of 
students from underprivileged backgrounds more likely to drop out for financial reasons. In the 
following sections I shall consider several relevant issues, including the adequacy of prior 
measures used, student mobility, differential school effects, missing data, endogeneity and other 
aspects of model misspecification.  
Prior information 
Most league table rankings, whether of schools or other institutions utilise a single measure of 
prior performance to adjust for selection factors, whether purposeful or haphazard. However, 
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there is evidence [14] that in the case of secondary schooling information about prior school 
attended and achievement during that period of school will generally change inferences, 
although other authors [15] suggest that in primary (elementary) schools rankings are relatively 
unaffected when a sequence of prior achievement measures is used as opposed to just one.  
 
Moving across institutions 
In practice many students will change school over the course of the period of schooling. Most 
rankings are published using the school membership at the time at which the outcome measure 
is taken. In most systems, however, there is movement during the course of a period of 
schooling so that the contributions of all schools attended should be taken into account. When 
this is done [15] the variation attributable to schools generally increases, but again seems to 
have little effect on the rankings.  
To take account of such mobility we may use a multiple membership model. This involves 
extending (1) as follows. The following is a model for just two schools (1,2)  for simplicity, where 
students can move between them. 
𝑦𝑖{𝑗1𝑗2} = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖{𝑗1𝑗2} + 𝑤1𝑖𝑗1𝑢𝑗1 + 𝑤1𝑖𝑗2𝑢𝑗2 + 𝑒𝑖{𝑗1𝑗2}  
𝑤1𝑖𝑗1 + 𝑤𝑖𝑗2 = 1                                                                                                            (2) 
𝑒𝑖𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑒
2),      𝑢𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2)  
This states that the random effect contribution to the response is a weighted combination of the 
random effects associated with the schools attended. For several schools we will have 
contributions from one or more with associated weights. The weights have to be chosen, for 
example proportional to the time spent at each institution. We shall see later that in some cases 
these weights can be estimated. In practice we can carry out sensitivity analyses with different 
weighting functions, possibly choosing the one that produces the best ‘fit’, for example as 
judged by the DIC statistic in a Bayesian analysis [16]. One consequence of (2) is that the total 
level 2 variance has the form 𝜎𝑢
2 ∑ 𝑤𝑖ℎ
2 ≤ 𝜎𝑢
2
ℎ , so that ignoring mobility will lead to an 
underestimate of the level 2 variance. Further details on fitting such models are given in [9, 
Chapter 13].  
Moving within institutions 
In the case of schools, especially secondary or high schools, data may be available longitudinally 
for students at the end of each year of schooling, and thus attached to different teachers who 
will provide separate effects on outcome measures. Multiple membership models such as (2) 
can be adapted for this situation [6]. Such a model can be written as 
7 12 August 2014 
 
𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑗 = (𝑋𝛽)𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑡𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼𝑡𝑡∗𝑢𝑡∗ + 𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡∗<𝑡 ,       𝑡 = 1, … 𝑝                (3) 
where at the end of year t we have a contribution from the current teacher (𝑢𝑡𝑗) and 
contributions from all the different teachers prior to year t (𝑢𝑡∗). The covariates (X) can include 
prior attainment as well as, for example, socio-economic indicators and school level variables. 
This model is known as the general persistence model (𝛼𝑡𝑡∗ < 1) with a special case being the 
‘complete persistence’ model where 𝛼𝑡𝑡∗ = 1, indicating that each previous teacher has the 
same effect on a future outcome irrespective of how far ahead this may be. We also allow the 
level 1 (occasion) residuals for a student to be correlated across occasions. It is also assumed 
that there is enough movement among groups of students from year to year to enable 
identification of the model parameters. 
To illustrate this model in a simple case with just 3 occasions, we have 
𝑦1𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽10 + 𝑢1𝑗 + 𝑒1𝑖𝑗   
𝑦2𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽20 + 𝑢2𝑗 + 𝛼21𝑢1𝑗 + 𝑒2𝑖𝑗   
𝑦3𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽30 + 𝑢3𝑗 + 𝛼32𝑢2𝑗 + 𝛼31𝑢1𝑗 + 𝑒2𝑖𝑗  
This basic model can be extended in a number of ways.  
 If we have several teachers for each student in any given year then we can introduce 
standard multiple membership weights for each student where these add to 1.0 as in (2).  
 The pupil level residual covariance matrix can be structured as a function of time to reduce 
the number of parameters, for example 𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝑒0𝑖 + 𝑒1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡𝑖𝑗  . 
 Extra levels, such as that of school, or cross classifications can be introduced. 
 Generalised linear models can be used. 
 We can accommodate the same teacher in more than one year by modifying the indicator 
matrix for the teacher random effects. 
 A multivariate extension is possible whereby we can model outcomes in more than one 
curriculum subject. 
It is possible that in any given dataset we may be missing the teacher identification for some 
students for some years. In this case one approach is to assume that all those students with a 
missing teacher identification in any given year belong to a new ‘pseudo’ teacher and sample 
accordingly. An alternative is to assume that the true teacher is one of those for whom data are 
available and use weights similar to multiple membership weights corresponding to the 
observed distribution of students among these teachers.  
These models are used in many State education systems in the United States of America to 
evaluate teachers and an introduction to a series of papers discussing their strengths and 
weaknesses can be found in Beardsley et al. [20]. A key issue is that the confidence intervals 
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associated with any one teacher tend to be large and sensitive to the assumptions of the model 
[6].  
Differential effectiveness 
So far I have assumed a simple (random) effect for an institution. There is now a great deal of 
evidence, at least for schooling, that the institutional effect will also depend upon the 
characteristic of the individual, for example whether a girl or a boy or an initial low or high 
achiever [17]. This can be incorporated using a random coefficient model such as the following 
where we allow different random effects for boys and girls, parameterised in terms of an overall 
school effect and one for the boy-girl difference. 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖𝑗+𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢1𝑗𝑥2𝑖𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗                                                               (4) 
or alternatively  
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖𝑗+𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢2𝑗𝑥2𝑖𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗         
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑗,       𝛽2𝑗 = 𝛽2 + 𝑢2𝑗    
(
𝑢0
𝑢2
) ~𝑁 (
0
0
,
𝜎𝑢0
2
𝜎𝑢02 𝜎𝑢2
2 ),       𝑒𝑖𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑒
2)                             
 When such a model is introduced comparisons may alter considerably. Thus Yang et al. [18] 
show that rankings of primary schools can be very different for initially high and low achievers. 
They also demonstrate that miss-specifying the model by ignoring a random coefficient for initial 
test score results in a spuriously high correlation between the adjusted and unadjusted school 
effects.  
Endogeneity and model misspecification 
Some forms of model misspecification can lead to endogeneity, whereby one or more covariates 
in the model is correlated with the random effects, in particular with the level 2 residuals. For 
example, in the model given by (4), if the term 𝑢1𝑗𝑥2𝑖𝑗 is omitted then this component of the 
level 2 variation will be absorbed into the 𝑢0𝑗 with the result that these random effects will, in 
part, depend on the 𝑥2𝑖𝑗 so inducing a relationship with the covariate in the fixed effects part of 
the model. Such an omission will lead generally to misleading inferences for institutional 
rankings.  In general it would seem to be preferable to report and base decisions on estimates 
from the full model, where these are available. It may be the case that, for some purposes, 
however, we would wish to estimate the parameters of the simpler model given by (1), 
effectively marginalising (4) over the random coefficient effects. By default, such marginalisation 
will typically be carried out with respect to the observed sample, assumed to be representative 
of a suitably defined population. In this case it is easy to show that a standard estimation, for 
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example using maximum likelihood,  that assumes (1) is the correct model, will provide biased 
estimates for the required marginal model and this is an example of a failure to take account of 
endogeneity.  
The issue, however, is not straightforward since we may choose to marginalise with respect to a 
different population structure. For example, it would seem reasonable in some circumstances to 
‘standardise’ the within-school distribution of gender, in order to adjust for different proportions 
of male and female students which are considered irrelevant to the making of comparisons. In 
such a case we might choose to marginalise with respect to having equal numbers within each 
school. We can think of this as applying equal weights to the male and female effects for each 
school. Another example would be where the coefficient of prior achievement varied randomly 
across schools and marginal estimates might be desired for a ‘standard’ distribution of prior 
achievement so that schools could be compared directly having after prior achievement was 
adjusted for. To carry out such marginalisations, for example using bootstrap methods, we first 
need to fit the fully specified model. Thus, alternative methods such as GEE (see for example 
Hubbard et al. [19]) that fit marginal methods directly, effectively using the observed sample 
structure, are generally not appropriate.  
The issue of endogeneity is really part of a general concern with model misspecification, rather 
than the narrower concern with biased estimates for a particular marginal model. 
 Measurement error 
Measurement or category misclassification errors will usually be present in measures used as 
both responses and predictors in models such as (1) and more complex models. It is quite rare 
for these to be taken into account, although they will typically result in biased parameter 
estimates if ignored. A discussion of the effect of measurement errors is given by Ferrao and 
Goldstein [21] who show that in one data set the effects of such errors can be large if not 
properly adjusted for.  
Missing data 
A standard procedure for handling missing data is via multiple imputation [22] where 
missingness is assumed to be random, at least conditionally upon other measured variables. In 
essence this relies upon being able to sample (impute) from a posterior distribution estimated 
for the value being considered.  Missing data values can arise essentially in two ways. One of 
these is the usual way when values of a measurement, such as a test score, are unobserved. The 
other way is when an identification, for example of a teacher or school is unknown. The latter 
case has already been mentioned in the case of a missing teacher identification where it was 
10 12 August 2014 
 
suggested that an imputed value for the (unknown) teacher could be obtained according to 
assumptions regarding the reason for the missing identification. Goldstein [12, Chapter 13] 
discusses estimation for such models. This is an area that seems to have been little explored and 
where further empirical data would be useful. 
Multivariate models 
The extension to multiple outcomes of interest is relatively straightforward, and apart from 
computational considerations, few new issues occur. The advantage of jointly modelling several 
outcomes at several levels is that the relationships between different types of institutional 
effects can be studied and this may be important for certain kinds of  judgements.  
Computationally, a new issue arises when the outcomes are of different types, such as a mixture 
of binary, normal and ordered responses. In such cases a ‘latent normal’ model can be fitted 
where ordered and binary variables are treated as deriving from underlying normal variables, 
extending the simple probit analysis model. This can also be extended to unordered categorical 
variables and count data (Goldstein [12, Chapter 7]). These models therefore allow the joint 
modelling of data such as exam passes, ordered exam grades and continuously distributed test 
scores, alongside, for example attitude ratings.   
For an example of a simple joint model studying mathematics and English examination results 
see Goldstein et al. [23].  
Modelling where outcomes are measured at higher levels 
So far I have described cases where the outcome of interest is measured at the lowest level of 
the data hierarchy, such as students in schools. 
Consider, for example, the case of policing where there is interest in comparing police forces or 
policing areas in terms of crime rates of different types. While the rate for an area is essentially 
an aggregation of individually reported incidents, there will often be few if any measurements at 
the level of the individual incident that are relevant for adjustment purposes. Thus, if we were 
interested in the efficiency of a police force in tackling burglary, it might be relevant to take 
account of the vulnerability of the properties where burglaries were reported, since this may 
differ among areas. Yet often such information may be available only in aggregate form at the 
area level. We may still use aggregate level variables for adjustment, but in general these will be 
less efficient, and if there is a small number of areas care will be needed to avoid over-fitting 
based on a large number of correlated covariates. 
In other cases data may only be defined at institutional level. For example rankings of reputation 
for universities are typically based upon responses from individuals asked to rate institutions 
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[24]. This case can be treated as one where for each institution we have a number of responses 
to be aggregated. Unlike the case of school exam results, however, we do not have independent 
responses across institutions since each rater provides a measure for each university, for 
example on a simple rating scale. Formally this can be modelled as a cross classification of raters 
by institutions and a simple model, assuming normality, can be written as 
𝑦{𝑗1𝑗2} = (𝑋𝛽){𝑗1𝑗2} + 𝑢𝑗1 + 𝑢𝑗2 + 𝑒{𝑗1𝑗2}                                     (4) 
𝑒{𝑗1𝑗2}~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑒
2),      𝑢𝑗1~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢1
2 ) ,      𝑢𝑗2~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢2
2 )  
In this model adjustment variables (X) may be obtained from the raters or measured at the 
institutional level. If uncertainty intervals are required for such rankings then they need to take 
account of the data structure as derived from a model such as (4), and will typically be larger 
than naïve estimates that treat the responses as independent.  
Adjusting for rater characteristics will be especially important since such rankings are often 
derived using ‘convenience’ samples such as those derived from databases of journal authors. 
Thus, for example, larger institutions will tend to produce more authors and therefore have 
greater representation in the samples used. In this case careful consideration would need to be 
given to the possibility of weighting respondents to obtain what might be considered a 
‘representative’ sample, although this is clearly a matter for debate. 1 
Examples 
We now look at two examples that apply some of the above models and show how the results 
are relevant within an educational accountability framework.  
Our first example is a data set on a cohort of 5748 students in 66 Secondary schools in Inner 
London. They entered their Secondary (High) schools in year 7 (ages 11 and 12 years) and took 
school leaving examinations in year 11 (1987). Further details are available in [23]. Cases with 
any missing data (35%) were excluded from this analysis. A study of these did not suggest any 
serious biases among those with complete data. Ideally a more efficient analysis could be carried 
out using multilevel multiple imputation procedures (Goldstein et al., [25]) but for simplicity of 
illustration we will present only the complete case analysis. 
Since Secondary schools differ in the mean academic achievements of the students entering, we  
employ a ‘value added’ model where the principal variable used to adjust for intake 
achievement is a reading test score (London Reading Test, LRT) taken during the year before 
entry. The basic aim of the analysis is to explore the extent to which schools can be held 
                                                          
1 Additionally, the samples obtained in such surveys often have response rates as low as about 10% which 
raises additional concerns about bias. (Phil Baty, personal communication) 
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accountable for the examination results of their students, after adjusting for selection factors 
(prior achievement scores) and also looks at differences between curriculum subjects. The 
response (𝑦) and the LRT score (𝑥1) are both transformed to have standard normal distributions. 
Other predictors are gender (𝑥2 with boys as the reference category), school gender, Girls 
school (𝑥3), Boys school (𝑥4)  and mixed gender school (the reference category), and school 
denomination, Church of England (CE, 𝑥5), Roman catholic (RC, 𝑥6) and State maintained (the 
reference category). In addition the results of a verbal reasoning test, also taken prior to entry, 
are used where students are grouped into 3 categories representing approximately 25%, 50% 
and 25% of the distribution: the three categories are VR1 (𝑥7), VR2 (𝑥8) and VR3 as the 
reference category. 
The final fitted model where the normalised examination score is the response is as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1
(2)
𝑥1𝑖𝑗
2 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑗
4
𝑘=3 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑗
6
𝑘=5 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑗
8
𝑘=7 + 𝑢0𝑗 +
           𝑢1𝑗𝑥1𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢2𝑗𝑥5𝑖𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗   
(
𝑢0𝑗
𝑢1𝑗
𝑢2𝑗
) ~𝑁(0, Ω𝑢),       𝑒𝑖𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎0
2 + 𝜎01𝑥1𝑖𝑗)     (5) 
Thus, at the school level we have an overall (intercept) effect, a linear component of the 
relationship with LRT that varies across schools and a difference between the VR1 and combined 
VR2+VR3 categories, that varies across schools, and it is assumed that these have a 3-variate 
normal distribution. At the pupil level we assume a normally distributed residual with a variance 
that is a linear function of the LRT score. Table 1 gives maximum likelihood estimates for this 
model; see [9, Chapter 2] for details.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1. Analysis of total examination score.  
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Fixed coefficients Estimate 
(standard 
error) 
  
𝛽0 -0.53   
𝛽1 0.37 (0.02)   
𝛽1
(2)
 0.035 (0.008)   
𝛽2 0.13 (0.03)   
𝛽3 0.07 (0.06)   
𝛽4 0.09 (0.07)   
𝛽5 -0.04 (0.13)   
𝛽6 0.20 (0.06)   
𝛽7 0.70 (0.04)   
𝛽8 0.31 (0.03)   
Between-school variation (𝛀𝒖). (𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 ) 
 𝑢0 𝑢1 𝑢2 
𝑢0 0.055   
𝑢1 0.012 (0.75) 0.0046  
𝑢2 0.013 (0.40) 0.009 (0.97) 0.019 
Between student variation 
𝜎0
2 0.55   
𝜎01 0.046   
 
For the fixed coefficients we see, as expected, large and statistically significant (at the 5% level) 
effects for the LRT score with a quadratic relationship indicated, for the VRT category, for 
gender, with girls on average scoring higher than boys, and for attendance at a Roman Catholic 
school. At level 2 there is statistically significant variation associated with the LRT score (?̅?3 =
24.7, 𝑃 < 0.001) and the VR1 category (?̅?3 = 11.0, 𝑃 = 0.008) where in each case the null 
hypothesis is that the variance term and two associated covariances are zero. The chi-bar test 
statistic is used [9, Chapter 2] since the variance term is constrained to be non-negative.  At level 
1 there is a significant positive relationship of the variance with the LRT score (𝜒2 = 66.0, 𝑝 <
0.001).   
Using these model estimates we show in figure 2 (corresponding to Figure 1 above) the residual 
or school effects for the reference categories and the mean value (0) of LRT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Residual estimates with 95% confidence intervals for examination score data. 
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We see again the marked uncertainty associated with comparisons among schools.  
Since the school effect is also a function of LRT score and VR band we can estimate the effect at 
different values. Thus, for example we can take two extreme groups, the low achievers at intake 
with an LRT score of -2 (approximately the lower 2.5 percentile) and in VR bands 2 or 3, 
compared with the high achievers at intake with an LRT score of 2 (approximately the upper 97.5 
percentile) and VR band 1. Figure 3 shows the scatterplot of these estimated from the model as 
(𝑢0𝑗 − 2𝑢1𝑗, 𝑢0𝑗 + 2𝑢1𝑗 + 𝑢2𝑗) respectively. 
Figure 3. High versus low achievers: school residual estimates 
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While there is a moderate correlation between these it can be seen that schools do appear to 
differ in terms of how different types of students perform. 
An additional analysis was undertaken [23] in which separate examination scores where English 
and Mathematics scores were analysed jointly in a bivariate 2-level model. This allows us to 
estimate a school effect for both mathematics and English and Figure 4 shows the relationship 
between these estimated residuals. 
The estimated correlation between the Mathematics and English school effects is only about 0.1 
and this is reflected in Figure 4. Together with the differential effectiveness as a function of 
intake achievement and the large amounts of uncertainty, any use of such data in the form of 
overall (unidimensional) league tables will be highly problematic. Nevertheless, for screening 
purposes, to identify schools that may be performing unexpectedly poorly or well, identifying 
such schools from such plots may be useful and this is discussed in more detail in [2] and [3]. Our 
next example looks at school comparisons further in the specific context of school choice. 
Figure 4. English and Mathematics examination scores estimated residuals. 
 
 
 
This example is a national data set (the National Pupil Database, NPD) which contains 
longitudinal performance data on all students within maintained (state funded) schools in 
England. Further details can be found in Leckie and Goldstein, [10,26]. The students are 
allocated a unique identification when they enter the system and events such as school changes, 
and test and exam scores are recorded, together with limited demographic information and data 
on the schools they attend. This database is used both for research purposes and to produce 
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annual league tables of schools based upon test and examination scores, both  unadjusted and 
adjusted. Within an accountability context one of the uses claimed for these tables is that they 
assist parents in choice of schools, especially secondary schools and that this process will favour 
the choice of ‘good’ schools in terms of how they promote student achievements.  
 
In the context of secondary school choice, a parent who decides to base a choice, at least in part, 
on such a school ranking will generally have available, at best, results that apply to the previous 
year’s cohort. Their interest, however, is in the future performance of the school in five or six 
years’ time when their child will take the equivalent examination, say in year (grade) eleven. The 
problem thus becomes a prediction problem from a current set of school effects to a future set 
of school effects. Leckie and Goldstein [10] utilise GCSE (school leaving) examination data for 
two cohorts over a six year period (2005 and 2010) where prior achievement data on both 
cohorts are available.  
The relevant model for the two cohorts of students can be written as 
 
 
           
           
1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
0 1
ij ij j ij
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    
 
 
where superscripts ‘(1)’ and ‘(2)’ denote cohort 1 and cohort 2. Hence  
1
ijy  is the GCSE score for 
the ith pupil in the jth school in cohort 1 (2005) whilst  
2
ijy  is the GCSE score for the ith pupil in 
the jth school in cohort 2 (2010). The level 2 school residuals in general will be correlated. The 
level 1 residuals for the two responses are modelled as independent as a pupil can only belong 
to one cohort. Hence, this is a bivariate model where the bivariate structure is at level 2 rather 
than in the traditional multivariate multilevel model where it is at both levels.  
From this model, having obtained the parameter estimates we can obtain estimates of the 
cohort 2 predicted school effects as functions of the terms in Ω𝑢, Ω𝑒  and the 𝑦𝑖𝑗
(1) . For school j 
this is given by  
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𝜌𝑢12𝑛𝑗
(1)
𝜎𝑢
2
(𝑛𝑗
(1)
𝜎𝑢
2+𝜎𝑒1
2 )
?̃?𝑗
(1)
  
where  
1
jy  is the mean of the raw residuals for the jth school in cohort 1, with a corresponding 
term for the estimated standard error. From this we can construct a caterpillar plot that ranks 
the predicted school effects together with interval estimates. This is illustrated in Figure 5 that 
uses the results for 19 Secondary schools in Bristol with 96% confidence intervals. The results are 
striking with all intervals overlapping, thus providing no reliable separation.  
 
Figure 5. Predicted school effects for 19 Bristol schools with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Leckie and Goldstein[26] go on to present school comparisons in terms of probabilities, that for 
any given set of schools forming a choice set, any particular one will have the largest or smallest 
predicted effect. Figure 6 illustrates this for three chosen schools. 
For none of the schools is there a better than even chance of being ranked first. Displays such as 
this can convey the extensive uncertainty in ways that are clearly intelligible to non-technical 
audiences.  
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Figure 6 Probability that school G, N and O are predicted to be ranked 1st, 2nd or 3rd  
 
 
Conclusions 
As pointed out in the introduction, I have concentrated on a consideration of the statistical 
issues, with illustrative examples, and I have not spent time discussing side effects including 
‘perverse incentives’ for institutions to behave in ways that may not serve the best interests of 
those whom they are meant to serve, be they students, patients or the general public. All of 
these issues are, however, both important and researchable and the producers of league tables 
need to do more to encourage such research. A fuller discussion is given in [3]. The evidence, 
where suitable data are available, is that rankings of institutions have large measures of 
uncertainty attached to them, even when appropriate adjustments for selection effects have 
been made. Perhaps the most effective uses of institutional rankings are as screening 
instruments that can suggest where problems may be occurring, rather than diagnoses of what 
the problems are.   
I am not suggesting that league tables should never be published. There is clearly a need for 
accountability from public (and other) institutions and quantitative data that bear on 
performance are a useful tool for this. When such data are reported publicly, however, their 
quality and reliability need to be displayed also so that users of the data are not misled about 
what can be inferred. To withhold information about the uncertainty of rankings is to deprive 
users of information they are entitled to. 
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While there may be useful work to be done in the further development the models described 
here, a more pressing need is to find ways of enhancing data quality and especially ways of 
preventing unrealistic inferences being drawn from over-simple presentations of results. For 
example, it is perfectly possible to develop software for sites that host institutional databases, in 
order to provide information similar to that in Figure 6. This could be done in real time and 
display bespoke comparisons among institutions. By displaying the real uncertainty surrounding 
institutional comparisons it would help users to make properly informed judgements. 
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